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Research on the question of what makes firms perform well has shown that product 
market competition, financial pressure and ownership or ownership identity are 
important performance drivers. Recently the issue of whether or not their impact is 
influenced by environmental or contextual characteristics has received increasing 
attention. In this paper we test, on a sample of Belgian firms, whether performance 
drivers behave differently in a non-quoted environment as compared to a quoted one. 
Our main result is that the impact of competition, financial pressure and family 
control does indeed depend upon whether the firm is quoted or not. Overall, for non-
quoted companies the performance drivers do not enhance performance and in most 
cases are even detrimental. For quoted companies however the results are just the 
opposite. We find that this difference in driver functioning explains the better 
performance of quoted firms vis-à-vis their private peers. 
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Introduction 
 
What factors affect corporate performance is an important issue in corporate 
finance. Since the innovative work by Nickell et al. (1997) a quickly growing 
literature investigates the link between productivity and performance drivers. Thereby 
product market competition, financial pressure and corporate control are reported to 
be important determinants of productivity (e.g. Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999; Nickell 
and Nicolitsas, 1999; Januszewski et al., 2002; Barth et al., 2005 among others).  
Although most studies indicate that overall these drivers tend to have a beneficial 
effect, some authors indicate that the impact of these forces may be affected by 
institutional and contextual characteristics. Several papers find that the development 
of stock markets and the national corporate governance systems influence the 
ownership performance relationship (e.g. Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). Also the identity of the 
owner rather than the level of ownership itself proves to have an important effect (e.g. 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; McConaughty et al., 1998). 
Next, depending on the architecture of the legal and financial system, even the impact 
of leverage on company performance may differ across countries (e.g. Weill, 2001; 
Simerly and Li, 2000). Environmental dynamism has also been proven to influence 
the ownership performance relationship (Li and Simerly, 1998). 
What is lacking research attention to date is the question of the impact of a stock 
market quotation on the functioning of performance drivers. This is surprising as the 
advantages and disadvantages of being a public firm is a matter of fundamental debate 
in the corporate governance literature (e.g. Myers 2000; Allen, 1993; Mayer and 
Alexander, 1991; Jensen, 1989) and the literature on IPO’s (Pagano et al., 1998; 
Ehrhardt and Nowak, 2003) 
This paper investigates empirically how the public stock market affects the 
functioning of the main determinants of firm performance, viz. product market 
competition, financial pressure and owner identity (family versus non-family 
controlled firm). This is realized by studying both quoted and unquoted firms. The 
present research contributes to the literature in several ways. It is the first paper to 
evaluate directly the impact of a stock listing on the functioning of performance 
drivers. In this way it sheds more light on how and through what channels a public 
stock market environment affects firms. Simultaneously it contributes to our   3
understanding of what circumstances positively or negatively influence the 
functioning of performance drivers. Looking at quoted and unquoted firms has the 
advantage that one can study the impact of contextual factors like differences in 
transparency, capital constraints and agency problems with outside shareholders 
within the same country. This allows for a relatively clean test as it avoids the 
problem of having to control for possibly many influencing institutional differences 
between countries. Finally, we study the impact of stock listing in a typical 
Continental European country, viz. Belgium. Notwithstanding a quickly growing 
literature, the impact of the stock market on companies in countries with less 
transparent and insider dominated financial systems is still far less understood. 
Within our sample of quoted and non-quoted Belgian firms over the period 1992-
2003, we find that the relationship between the determinants and performance does 
indeed depend on whether the company is quoted or not. Specifically, after 
controlling for the endogenous nature of several variables, we find for publicly quoted 
firms that competition, financial pressure (although not always significant) and family 
ownership have a positive impact on corporate performance. These results are similar 
to the literature where samples of mainly public companies are used. By contrast, 
competition, financial pressure and family ownership negatively influence 
performance in private firms. We also find that overall, public firms perform better, 
and that this improved performance may be explained by the different way in which 
drivers function in a quoted versus a non-quoted environment. Our results support the 
hypothesis that, as they amplify capital constraints, competition and financial pressure 
negatively affect non-quoted companies. These findings are in line with Povel and 
Raith (2004), Rajan (1992), Pagano et al. (1998), McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
among others, who indicate that competition or financial pressure may be harmful to 
cash strapped firms. Consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003), Randoy et al. (2003), 
Maury (2006), our findings about family ownership indicate that lack of transparency 
and/or diversification opportunities, decreases the effectiveness of family firms as an 
organizational structure. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we discuss the 
impact of a stock listing on the functioning of our performance drivers. Section 2 
contains the sample description, methodology and univariate statistics. Section 3 
presents and discusses the results, while Section 4 contains the conclusions. 
   4
1. The impact of stock listing on performance drivers  
 
The extensive literature on corporate governance and on initial public offerings 
discusses many costs and benefits of going/being public (e.g. Allen, 1993; Jensen, 
1989; Pagano et al., 1998; Faure-Grimaud and Gromb, 2004). These studies indicate 
that, from the perspective of the company, the benefits mainly reflect different aspects 
of two major advantages of being quoted: the information production/transparency in 
financial markets and the reduction in capital constraints. By contrast, Jensen (1989), 
Mayer and Alexander (1991), Myers (2000) among others, also show that the agency 
problem between insiders (management or controlling owners) and outside 
shareholders likely is the most important disadvantage. These properties of a stock 
listing create new opportunities and pressures that may influence the effectiveness of 
performance drivers. 
 
1.1. The stock market and competition 
 
Competition in the product market is generally considered to be beneficial for 
corporate productivity. Nickell (1996) and Nickell et al. (1997), among others, argue 
that there are three ways in which competition influences performance. First, it is 
easier for owners or the market to monitor managers in a competitive environment 
because there are more opportunities for comparison. Second, more competition is 
likely to raise the probability of bankruptcy and provides incentives for management 
to work harder to avoid this outcome. Third, due to the fact that demand elasticities 
tend to be higher under competition, the relative reward of a cost reduction is higher 
in a competitive environment, ceteris paribus. Clearly, preceding aspects of 
competition involve a reduction in free cash flow problems and a more efficient use of 
resources. 
However, Cohen and Levin (1989), Aghion and Howitt (1998), Aghion et al. 
(2001) among others point out that, next to contributing to efficiency, competition 
also stimulates innovation, which in turn creates opportunities for new cash flow 
production. Specifically, the information production on innovation opportunities 
embedded in the possibility of comparison, is useful both for managers having to 
design innovative strategies and for monitoring owners. Next, non-innovative firms 
may be driven out of the market in a competitive environment, giving managers an 
incentive to work harder to avoid this outcome. For public firms, empirical tests   5
(Januszewski et al., 2002; Nickell et al., 1997; Grosfeld and Tressel, 2002; Rogers, 
2004 among others) show indeed a positive relationship between competition and 
performance. The effectiveness of the preceding aspects of competition in improving 
performance may however be different for a non-quoted firm. Below we develop 
hypotheses about these issues. 
As compared to a listed one, ceteris paribus, a non-quoted firm operates in a less 
transparent environment with less agency problems between management and 
shareholders (no or few outside shareholders) and more capital constraints. Even in a 
less transparent environment, in view of their concentrated ownership, the 
performance driving aspects of competition that involve a reduction in free cash flow 
problems and an increase in efficiency, are unlikely to add much to the performance 
of non-quoted firms. For large shareholders have an incentive to monitor and, 
furthermore, have opportunities to demand extra inside information from 
management. On top, capital constraints limit the maneuvering space of the latter. By 
contrast, also for private companies the information on innovation opportunities 
offered by a competitive environment remain useful both for managers and 
monitoring large owners. In fact, owners, understanding that non-innovating firms 
may be driven out of the market, have a strong incentive to monitor in order to avoid 
the loss of their investment. Nevertheless, in the presence of capital constraints, the 
innovation dimension of competition may loose effectiveness, and may even become 
a problem. Povel and Raith (2004) report that financially constrained firms have a 
tendency to under invest, therefore loose market share and overall suffer when 
competition amplifies the negative effects of financial constraints.
1 In sum, we do not 
expect competition to be very helpful in resolving free cash flow and efficiency 
problems in non-quoted firms; the innovation dimension may have positive effects, 
unless capital constraints prohibit managers to develop effective strategies to cope 
with the competitive pressures. 
For quoted firms, the situation is very different. First of all, notwithstanding the 
transparency/information production in public markets, the presence of small outside 
shareholders creates conflicts of interest with insiders. In particular, although in 
Continental Europe ownership concentration remains substantial in public firms, the 
separation between ownership and control is likely to be more important in those 
                                                 
1 Especially for smaller firms this may become a problem, as they likely have less deep pockets than 
larger companies.    6
companies as compared to unquoted ones. Furthermore, because of the presence of 
pyramidal structures where one company controls the next one in the line, managers 
exercise oversight over other managers. This may create a cascade of agency 
problems and weaken monitoring quality. Pyramidal ownership structures often also 
involve control over multiple firms and therefore stimulate the creation of conflicts of 
interest between large and small shareholders. For controlling owners are likely to 
take the perspective of the business group as a whole which may be at odds with the 
interests of one specific subsidiary. Following Jagannathan and Srinivasan (1999) we 
may argue that competition mitigates such problems because there are more 
opportunities for comparison. Furthermore Januszewski et al. (2002) and Allen and 
Gale (1999) find that even in the presence of weak governance, fierce product market 
competition causes increased survival pressure, forcing the decision makers in the 
firm to focus on efficiency. In fact, Rogers (2004) reports that competition boosts 
productivity only in an environment where agency costs are large. Also in the more 
transparent public market with its information production properties, the information 
on innovation opportunities offered by competition remains useful for managers and 
owners, while the threat of being driven out of the market, gives managers an 
incentive to work harder. Simultaneously, as quoted firms are less hampered by 
capital constraints, they have more opportunities to develop an effective response to 
the innovative strategies of competitors. 
Summarizing, we would hypothesize that competition is more beneficial for 
publicly quoted firms as compared to non-quoted ones as for the former competition 
is less likely to exacerbate the negative effects of capital constraints and 
simultaneously also serves as a useful tool in solving conflicts of interest.  
 
1.2. The stock market and financial pressure 
 
Financial pressure may influence firm performance (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; 
Nickel et al., 1997; Zingales, 1998; McConnell and Servaes, 1995 among others). 
First, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow argument implies that, as debt service payments 
reduce the amount of free cash flow at the disposal of management for over-
investment, firm performance improves. Second, as the debt level increases, the 
probability of default mounts (Molina, 2005). Therefore managers are forced to exert 
a higher effort in order to avoid this outcome (Dessi and Robertson, 2003). A third,   7
but negative way in which leverage influences performance, may arise when firms are 
cash strapped. The constant worry of meeting interest and principal repayments, may 
force firms to pass up good investment opportunities (McConnell and Servaes, 1995). 
In line with this argument, Molina (2005) reports a strong impact of leverage on the 
ex ante costs of financial distress which can offset the benefits of debt. Furthermore, 
as analyzed in Rajan (1992), in the private debt market, lenders may even gain 
negotiation power over borrowers and extract rents. These effects are likely to 
increase for low solvency firms that have used up most of their debt capacity.  
We hypothesize that financial pressure is not helpful in improving the 
performance of non-quoted companies; in fact it may even be harmful. In particular, 
the discussion above implies that the positive impact of financial pressure is likely to 
be confined to free cash flow/efficiency issues, ceteris paribus. However, we already 
argued that because of the concentrated ownership structure of non-quoted firms and 
the absence of small public shareholders, agency problems with management are 
expected to be limited. Therefore the positive properties of financial pressure are 
unlikely to contribute much to performance. By contrast, debt servicing and the lack 
of transparency may magnify capital constraints and negatively influence the firm’s 
ability to make use of business opportunities. Molina (2005) indeed reports that 
financially constrained firms find it difficult to adjust their leverage. As a 
consequence, management may be left with limited financial resources to react upon 
opportunities and threats from the business environment. Especially for smaller firms 
such effects may be important, as they are the ones that likely depend on fewer 
sources of income from product markets and suffer most from asymmetric 
information. 
We would expect financial pressure to be more beneficial to quoted companies as 
compared to non-quoted ones. Notwithstanding the transparency and information 
production in public markets, the presence of small outside shareholders causes 
conflicts of interest with insiders. The capacity of financial pressure to reduce free 
cash flow and increase bankruptcy risk is therefore likely to contribute to performance 
by mitigating agency problems and/or reducing the scope of expropriation by 
entrenched large shareholders (see also Jensen, 1986). In line with this argument, 
Ruland and Zhou (2005) show that the impact of leverage on company value is 
stronger for diversified companies, who are believed to suffer more from the agency 
costs of free cash flow and other agency problems.  Furthermore, Rajan (1992),   8
Pagano et al. (1998), Carletti (2004) among others, have shown that access to the 
public market reduces the dependence on (private) debt. Hence, financial pressure is 
far less likely to exacerbate capital constraints to the point where it becomes harmful 
to the firm. In fact, one could even imagine that, especially for large quoted firms, 
access to financing becomes so easy that, if necessary, debt can be replaced by equity 
so that the threat implied by debt servicing on management and/or large shareholders 
becomes less effective. 
 
1.3. The stock market and ownership identity 
 
Since the early work by Berle and Means (1932), the question of whether or not 
and how ownership structure influences firm performance, is an ever returning issue 
in the literature (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). More 
recently however, researchers like Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), McConaughy et al. 
(1998), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Barth et al. (2005), Maury (2006) among others, 
find evidence that the identity of owners may be more important in explaining 
company performance than the level of ownership itself. Following this line of 
literature, this paper focuses on family versus non-family ownership. There are 
several reasons for this choice. First, we use Continental European (i.e. Belgian) data. 
In such a sample the vast majority of firms - including the quoted ones - typically is 
controlled by a large shareholder or a syndicate of large owners. Hence, in view of the 
limited variation in this mode of control, it is more interesting to look at the identity 
of the owner. Second, everywhere in the world, family controlled companies make up 
an important category of firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that this is true even 
for US publicly quoted firms where roughly 35% of the S&P 500 Industrials can be 
identified as family controlled businesses. In Continental Europe, family firms are an 
even more prevalent ownership structure. According to Faccio and Lang (2002) the 
majority of listed companies in countries like Germany, France, Italy and Belgium are 
family controlled.  
Family control has both advantages and disadvantages relative to other types of 
owners (e.g. large corporations, institutional investors, business groups,…). The 
largest potential cost of family control is the incentive to benefit the family at the 
expense of firm performance. This is due to the entrenchment of the family 
management or the controlling family shareholder. Shleifer and Vishny (1997),   9
Mishra et al. (2001), among others, suggest that one of the largest costs controlling 
shareholders can impose, is remaining active in management, even if they are no 
longer competent or qualified to run the firm. This argument is confirmed empirically 
by Barth et al. (2005), who report for a sample of mostly non-quoted Norwegian firms 
that family owned and managed companies perform worse than family owned 
businesses managed by an outsider. A second major cost of family control is linked to 
lack of diversification in the controlling family’s portfolio. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), Randoy et al. (2003) among others, indicate that the resulting incentive to 
minimize risk distorts decision making in the company.  
A major benefit of this mode of control is the family’s strong incentive to monitor 
the firm more closely, so that agency conflicts with management are reduced (e.g. 
James, 1999; McConaughy et al., 1998; Schulze et al., 2002). One reason why 
families are such high quality monitors is the fact that their wealth is closely linked to 
the firm’s value. Another reason lies in the long investment horizon that often 
characterizes this type of owners. Both James (1999) and Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) 
point out that the will to pass on the firm to next generations, forces family firms to 
concentrate more on efficient long term investing. Finally, because of their emotional 
ties to the firm, family owners may opt for altruistic actions instead of personal 
considerations in order to preserve the firm through time. In Continental Europe, 
where concentrated ownership is prevalent, family ownership has the advantage that, 
contrary to other large owners like holding companies, venture firms, industrial 
owners etc., the wealth of the family members is directly involved. By contrast, in the 
case of corporate owners, managers exercise oversight over other managers. As 
discussed earlier, this may create a cascade of agency problems and weaken 
monitoring quality. 
As compared to other large owners however, family oversight is more apt to be of 
lower quality in unquoted firms. In particular, we would expect that in such 
companies the weaknesses of family control are likely to be more prominently 
present. For the close ties between family members, and the often occurring lack of 
clear rules distinguishing between firm and family relationships, may lead to policies 
that serve the family but are detrimental to the company. In the non-transparent 
environment of unquoted firms, such behavior may more easily prevail. This may 
especially be true for the smaller firms, where limited organizational complexity more 
easily accommodates for less professionalism on the part of the owners. This   10
argument is supported by Mahérault (2000) who observes that family firms feel more 
reluctant to go public because of the necessity to reveal management policies rather 
than because of the possible loss of control. Furthermore, one would expect the 
capital constraints that are more likely to prevail in a non-quoted environment to 
exacerbate the family’s diversification problem and bias investment decisions.  
As in the case of the preceding two performance drivers, we hypothesize that 
family ownership has a better impact on listed firms as compared to non-listed ones. 
The increased transparency and information production in public markets pressures 
families to become professionalized and pay more attention to the interests of the firm 
as a separate entity. Furthermore, similar to Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004), 
Marchisio and Ravasi (2001) among others, we expect that the easy access to funding 
and the liquidity offered by the stock market enables family owners to reduce their 
stake in order to solve their diversification problem. Furthermore, as other large 
shareholders are worse in dealing with the typical problems created by listing – i.e., 
monitoring problems and, especially for business groups, conflicts of interest between 
large and small owners – family control is more likely to be a positive force in listed 
as compared to unlisted firms. Consistent with this hypothesis, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) report for the U.S., and Faccio and Lang (2002) and Maury (2006) for a 
Western European sample, that family control needs well regulated and transparent 
financial markets in order to be an effective organizational structure.  
 




Our sample initially covers the 12 years 1992-2003 and contains all consolidated 
financial statements of Belgian firms. The data were gathered from the NBB 
(National Bank of Belgium) and Van Dijk Belfirst. Issuing consolidated statements 
only became a requirement in 1992 and then only for firms of sufficient size.
2 Quoted 
companies however are obliged to publish consolidated statements. As within our 
ultimate sample only 7 firms publish consolidated accounts because the latter 
                                                 
2 Consolidation is obligatory when 2 out of the following 3 size thresholds are exceeded: turnover 
exceeds 50,000,000 euros, total assets exceeds 25,000,000 euros, the company employs more than 500 
workers. From the year 2000 on, these criteria where relaxed to 25,000,000 ; 12,500,000 and 250 
respectively.   11
obligation is binding, the impact of this difference in treatment is limited. 
Nevertheless within our robustness checks discussed later on, these firms were deleted 
from some sub samples. Since our measure of product market competition is only 
available as of 1996, our multivariate models are tested over the period 1996-2003. 
Nevertheless the data before 1996 remain useful, as they allow us to calculate firm 
specific lagged variables without further loss of data points.
3 We exclude all financial 
firms as well as all companies that are mere production entities from a large 
international parent. In order to identify these latter companies we used data from 
either Amadeus or from the firms’ websites. Because of the pyramidal structures, the 
status of being unquoted requires special attention. Specifically, we exclude non-
quoted companies that either have a quoted parent or a quoted subsidiary. Subsidiaries 
from parents that have to issue consolidated accounts do not need to issue these 
consolidated statements themselves, except for publicly quoted firms that always have 
to publish such accounts. Nevertheless within our sample 49  unquoted firms that 
satisfy the size requirements but have a consolidating parent, voluntarily consolidate. 
Initially we keep these companies in our sample, but evaluate the impact of voluntary 
consolidation later on. This way, over the period 1996-2003 we end up with a sample 
that contains 1956 firm-year observations corresponding to 467 non-financial firms 
that published consolidated statements at least in some of the years under 
consideration.
 For the period 1992-2003 this amounts to 2711 firm years and 486 
firms
4. 
46 firms in our sample change their (public) status between 1996 and 2003. 6 
firms went private and ceased to publish consolidated accounts after this event. The 
40 remaining companies went public during the same time span. 27 of these entered 
the sample after the event, implying that we only have consolidated data for the 
period before as well as after quotation for 13 firms. Overall we have 363 companies 
for which we have consolidated statements covering only non-quoted years, 91 firms 
covering only quoted years and 13 firms for which the sample includes both quoted 
and unquoted years. 
Table 1 represents the sample composition. Panel A shows that the number of 
firms varies over the years with somewhat more companies issuing consolidated 
                                                 
3 We also re-estimated the multivariate models over the period 1992-2003 with an extrapolation of our 
product market competition variable into the earlier years. Results are robust. 
4 There are 19 firms (10 unquoted and 9 quoted) for which we only have data during the first four years 
(1992-1995) of the sample period and are therefore not included in the multivariate models later on.   12
statements in the second half of the period under study. It is important to our sample 
that companies can enter or leave during the sample period in order to avoid selection 
biases. Panel B of table 1 gives an overview of the industry distribution for both 
quoted and unquoted firms over the 1996-2003 period. Servicing includes the largest 
number of firms (140), followed by manufacturing (136) and distribution (94). This 
distribution over sectors is representative for the Belgian economy as a whole. Panel 
C, which represents the industry distribution for the whole sample period (1992-
2003), is of course very similar. 
 
*************************************** 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
**************************************** 
 
2.2. Variables  measurement 
 
In order to measure firm performance we use Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
5. 
TFP has been extensively used in a quickly growing literature (e.g. Palia and 
Lichtenberg, 1999; Nickell et al., 1997; Januszewski et al., 2002; Schoar, 2002; Barth 
et al., 2005 among others).
6 Commensurate with this research, the generic format of 
our regression equations is the empirical version of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function enhanced by performance drivers:  
 
i i i i e (.) f LNEMPL LNNETAS LNVA + + β + α =   (1) 
 
with LNVAi representing the output of firm i measured as (natural logarithm of) 
value added
7, LNEMPLi labor input measured as employment costs,
8 LNNETASi 
                                                 
5 We use TFP instead of Tobin’s Q to measure corporate performance because of comparability of 
findings with this quickly evolving literature and because Tobin’s Q is not available for non-quoted 
firms. 
6 Unlike the literature on production functions, where the efficiency measure from Cobb-Douglas and 
its corresponding input factors are the issue of interest, we do not use correction methods for input 
factors like, for instance, the Olley-Pakes correction. As we use TFP solely as a relative performance 
measure, no corrections other than the random effect estimation, industry adjusting and lagging of 
input factors are made. Our approach is very similar to other studies in the ownership performance 
literature that use TFP (Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999; Nickell et al., 1997; Januszewski et al., 2002; 
Schoar, 2002; Barth et al., 2005 among others). 
7 Value added is defined as total sales less material costs. This way we implicitly allow for material 
costs as a third input.   13
capital employed measured as the accounting value of net assets during that year,
9 f(.) 
a function containing performance drivers and ei an i.i.d. error term. TFP is the 
surplus of output relative to the output explained by the first two terms on the right 
hand side, and is assumed to be related to firm i’s performance drivers through the 
function f(.). In our paper these performance drivers are competition, financial 
pressure and type of owner (family/non-family). 
Rents from production typically proxy for the lack of product market competition. 
In order to avoid the problem that the more productive firms in an industry are 
assigned a lower competition measure than their peers, we do not calculate the rents 
on a firm level but on a peer group level (PEERRENT). Average peer group data 
based on trade description and size was constructed from the Amadeus database.
10 
While our industry identification is based on double digit Nace codes, the trade 
description identification in Amadeus is much more detailed.
11 This way, problems of 
linearity between our industry identification and peer group data are avoided. Rents 










with average operating surplus (EBITDA) less average nominal cost of capital 
(COC) for the particular peer group of a firm. This is scaled by average sales 
(SALES) of the peer group. Like Lehmann and Weigand (2000) and Januszewski et 
al. (2002), we do not use balance sheet EBITDA as a measure of raw operating 
surplus, but employ sales less costs of materials and labor. In economic terms this 
definition is equivalent to the definition of EBITDA. The cost of capital is calculated 
as rt
K*Kt, which is the cost of capital multiplied by capital (measured as average book 
value of net assets for the respective peer group). As in Nickell (1996) rt
K = d + rt, 
where d is the depreciation rate and rt is the risk free market interest rate. The 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Due to data availability we proxy the number of employees by the total employment costs of the 
company. This is unlikely to cause problems because of the very high correlation between total cost of 
employees and number of employees. 
9 Following the literature on capital budgeting, net working capital is treated as part of invested assets. 
10 In the Amadeus database a peer group of a specific firm is defined as the group of (European) firms 
with the same trade description and of comparable size. 
11 For example: Imbev, a large Belgian beer brewer is identified with industry code 15 (manufacturers 
of food and beverages) while its peer group in Amadeus consists of large European brewers.   14
depreciation rate is considered equivalent to the market premium multiplied by beta, 
while the peer group rents (PEERRENT) are to be interpreted as an inverse measure 
of product market competition. 
As in Dessi and Robertson (2003) and Weill (2001) amongst others, we use 
leverage to estimate the impact of financial pressure on performance. Leverage (LEV) 
is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Other authors e.g. Pagano et al. (1998), 
Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006), Denis and Mihov (2003) claim that not total 
leverage but bank debt may be a better proxy for financial pressure. Models were re-
estimated using total bank debt to total assets as a financial pressure measure. This 
model adjustment did not alter our main findings.
12 Therefore, and since most of our 
hypotheses concerning financial pressure do not only relate to bank debt, we report 
the results with leverage as our proxy for financial pressure.  
A last important driver of firm performance is ownership identity. A company is 
characterized as a family firm if the founding family still controls the business. The 
databases Belfirst and Amadeus do not contain ownership information on all non-
quoted companies as the latter do not have to publish this information. The website of 
the individual firms typically has information on the identity of the main owners, but 
not always on the exact ownership distribution. To overcome this problem, and to be 
able to compare, we use a similar approach to the one used in Anderson and Reeb 
(2003). We first check whether or not the family controls the majority of the shares. If 
this is the case the company is classified as a family firm. When exact ownership data 
is not available, we check the board of directors. If at least two members of the 
founding family are board members, a company is also considered to be family 
controlled. Family firms are indicated by the dummy FAMIL. 
Finally, variables may be interacted with the QUOTED dummy. This dummy is 1 
when the firm is listed on the stock exchange in that year.  
 
                                                 
12 We also used interests paid divided by sales as an alternative measure of financial pressure (as in 
Nickell et al. 1997). Results are not reported but are very similar to the estimates in this paper.   15
2.3 Univariate statistics 
 
Table 2 contains summary statistics.
13  
*************************************** 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
**************************************** 
 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the mean and the median for the 3 key variables of the 
production function, as well as the top and lower quartiles. We observe that the 
average firm in our sample has annual value added of about 121 million euros, 
employment costs of about 69 million euros and net assets (tangible fixed assets + net 
working capital) of about 186 million euros. 
These averages are influenced by a number of large companies, as shown by the 
median values that amount to respectively 32, 19 and 40 million euros.  The 
difference between quoted and non-quoted is important. When looking at median 
values, we see that the median value added of non-quoted companies (26 million 
euros) is less than half of the median value added of quoted firms (62 million euros). 
Employment and net assets are also much smaller for non-quoted companies. Median 
values vary roughly proportionately to the median of value added of private and 
public companies, although quoted firms seem to have relatively more net assets and 
somewhat less employment costs. This may indicate that, as compared to non-quoted 
firms, productivity of capital is lower but labor productivity somewhat higher in 
quoted companies. Nevertheless the quartiles show an important overlap in the size 
distribution of quoted and unquoted firms.
14 
Panel B of Table 2 contains summary statistics on the performance drivers. 
Quoted companies seem to be confronted with higher rents in their corresponding 
peer group. This holds true both for the average and median value, although the 
quartiles show an important degree of overlap of both distributions.
15 Non-quoted 
firms are also facing significantly stronger financial pressure as compared to quoted 
                                                 
13 The estimation methodology used in section 3 eliminates the need for correction for inflation. 
14 Although size issues are controlled for through the definition of the variables in the analysis of 
Section 3, the question of whether or not this difference in size between quoted and non-quoted firms 
may nevertheless have an impact on the structural relationship between firm performance and 
performance drivers is addressed separately in a robustness check later on.  
15 A comparable result was found using firm specific rents instead of the PEERRENT variable. Quoted 
companies earn significantly more rents in median terms (0.220) compared to their non-quoted 
counterparts (0.163). This could indicate that either non-quoted firms are located in more competitive 
industries or that these companies have less capacity to create rents.   16
companies. However the quartiles indicate that both groups contain highly levered as 
well as low levered firms. Finally, and comparable to the sample of Faccio and Lang 
(2002), about 50% of the companies in our sample are identified as family firms with 
a similar representation among quoted and non-quoted firms. The same holds true for 
the number of firm-year observations. 
 
3. Determinants of firm performance 
 
We first estimate the standard version of the general TFP-model in subsection 
3.1.. Then we add the QUOTED dummy to observe the general effect of listing, while 
correcting for the possible endogeneity of the public/private status. In subsection 3.2. 
we analyze the interaction between a stock market quotation and the performance 
drivers to gain more insight into the impact of listing on performance. Finally in 
subsection 3.3. we perform robustness checks on the possible impact of the difference 
in obligation to consolidate between quoted and non-quoted firms and the possible 
biases due to the decision to consolidate voluntarily. As the discussion in section 1 
indicated that the functioning of the performance drivers may also be influenced by 
size, we evaluate whether or not differences in firm size between the quoted and 
unquoted subsamples affects our results.
16  
 
3.1. How do performance drivers function on a general sample of firms (i.e. quoted 
and unquoted) ?   
 
In order to construct a benchmark, we estimate the standard version of the general 
TFP-model as given by equation (1) on our sample of quoted and unquoted firms
17:  
 
ijt 3 2 1
t ijt j ijt j j ijt
FAMIL LEV PEERRENT
LNEMPL LNNETAS LNVA
ε + η + η + η +
δ + β + α + ω =
   (2) 
 
                                                 
16 The difference in median rents and leverage between listed and unlisted companies is also addressed 
in a robustness check; see below. 
17 As in Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) we also estimate all models using 1 year lagged values of 
LNEMPL and LNNETAS but this does not substantially alter our results.   17
We test this model both with and without correcting for industry specific input 
elasticities. The inclusion of year effects (δ) eliminates the need to deflate any of the 
euro denominated variables (see also Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999; Wooldridge, 
2002)
18. We use fixed industry (2 digit Nace) effects (ϖ), but no fixed firm effects. 
Instead, we estimate all regressions using company random effects since fixed effects 
are not feasible in our setup as – typical for the ownership performance research – 
there is no (or very little) within company variation in the ownership and public status 
variables. Hausman tests comparing fixed, random and no effects show the 
appropriateness of the use of random effects within our sample. Hence, standard 
errors are adjusted to reflect the cross-correlation between observations of the same 
firm during the sample period due to common firm components. A similar approach is 
used by Baum and Thies (1999) and La Porta et al. (2002) among others. Since the 
random effects estimation allows for any unobserved firm heterogeneity that might 
influence performance, possible biases for omitted variables or unobserved firm 
characteristics are controlled for.  
A second issue that has to be tackled is the endogeneity problem in our financial 
pressure variable (LEV) and in the firm’s public status (QUOTED). Since financial 
pressure is a determinant of performance, a change in the former may affect firm 
performance. However, we may also argue that it is easier for well performing 
companies to attract more credit so that overall the ease with which debt is obtained, 
is in itself influenced by performance. Molina (2005) shows that ignoring the 
endogeneity of leverage leads to an underestimation of its impact. We try to solve this 
problem in two ways. First, as proposed by Wooldridge (2002), we use one year 
lagged values for the LEV variable. Second, we build a separate model for leverage, 
and use its predictions as our measure for financial pressure. Following Dessi and 
Robertson (2003) we include explanatory variables that significantly affect debt but 
do not significantly influence performance. Specifically, we use size, non-debt tax 
shields and tangible assets next to the lagged value of leverage in our auxiliary 
regression.
19 The QUOTED dummy is subject to a similar problem. Also here an 
endogeneity or reverse causality problem could occur since public status is, to some 
extend, affected by performance as well. For example, companies that are unable to 
                                                 
18 As we use natural logarithms it is not necessary to deflate nominal values of the variables because 
the impact of inflation is absorbed by the year dummies.  
19 As a further robustness check TFP and LEV are estimated simultaneously. This does not affect the 
findings.   18
grasp the benefits of listing may change their public status through privatization. 
Again we try to mitigate this problem by first estimating the public status of a 
company and using the predictions as instruments for the QUOTED dummy.
20,21 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results for the benchmark models. The left part of 
the Table (labelled “Lagged variables”) shows the results of the estimation where the 
endogeneity problem of leverage and the public/private status of the firms is solved 
with the lagged variable. The right hand side of the Table (labelled “Instrumental 
variables”) presents the findings with the instrumental variable approach. In the first 
and third column, only fixed industry effects are taken into account based on a double 
digit Nace code level. Columns 2 and 4 (Industry specific elasticities) of the Table 
present fixed industry effects models where, in addition, the coefficients for the input 
elasticities, α and β, are estimated for each broad industry category as given by Table 
1, thereby correcting for industry specific elasticities of the Cobb-Douglas inputs.  
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All models show the normal positive coefficients for the standard Cobb-Douglas 
function with the input share of labor around 0.70 and the input share of capital 
around 0.30. The impact of competition is significantly negative (since PEERRENT 
can be interpreted as an inverse measure of competition). Also leverage proves to 
have a significant negative effect on productivity. These results are not in line with 
most of the literature (e.g. Nickell, 1997; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Januszewski et 
al., 2002 among others), where usually a positive influence of competition and 
financial pressure on productivity is reported. However, these latter results were 
obtained on samples of (mostly) publicly quoted firms. Also contrary to Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) who report a significant positive effect for their sample of quoted 
companies, we find a negative impact of family control on performance. By contrast, 
                                                 
20 The instrumental variable for QUOTED is estimated with a logit model using as dependent variables 
return on assets, peer group investment opportunities, size and industry and year dummies. 
21 Another solution commonly used in the literature, i.e. Heckman 2 step, is not really appropriate for 
the problem at hand. Since we use all available quoted and non-quoted observations from the 
population of Belgian consolidated companies during our sample years (except for financial firms and 
mere production entities), sample selection problems are not an issue. The endogeneity (or reversed 
causality) problem however remains for which we use the instrumental variable technique as explained 
in the text.    19
Barth et al. (2005) find similar results to ours for family ownership on their sample of 
mostly non-listed firms. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the results of the models of panel A when the QUOTED 
dummy is included. All coefficients remain comparable to the previous findings, 
although family control looses significance in some of the model specifications. The 
QUOTED dummy is positive and significant, and indicates that quoted companies 
have a higher productivity level than non-quoted ones. The differences between the 
coefficients of QUOTED in the left and right hand side of the Table indicate that the 
effect of stock listing is enhanced when we control for endogeneity. This suggests that 
overall the properties of listing (i.e. transparency/information production, better 
access to capital but more conflicts of interest) have a positive impact.
22 However, our 
earlier analysis also suggests that the impact of performance drivers may depend upon 
whether or not the firm is quoted. Therefore the QUOTED dummy may pick up this 
(indirect) effect, rather than the direct impact of listing. Subsequent analysis looks 
into this matter. 
 
3.2. How do performance drivers interact with the environment of the public capital 
market ?   
 
To test our hypotheses from Section 1 we interact the (instrumented) QUOTED 
dummy with our three performance drivers. Furthermore, to control for possible 
differences in the productivity of the inputs, we also interact the employment and 
capital inputs from the Cobb-Douglas function with this dummy. The results are 
shown in Table 4. Except for the interaction terms with the QUOTED dummy, the 
same methodology as in Table 3 is used. 
Concerning the Cobb-Douglas input elasticities and their interaction with 
QUOTED, Table 4 shows that, controlling for differences in competition, financial 
pressure and ownership identity, productivity of capital and labor is not significantly 
different between quoted and non-quoted companies.  
As PEERRENT is an inverse measure for competition, its positive coefficient 
indicates that competition has a significantly negative impact on productivity for non-
quoted companies. By contrast, the coefficient of the interaction between the 
                                                 
22 Other studies that have included a dummy for public listing also find a positive effect (e.g. Barth et 
al., 2005; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000).   20
QUOTED dummy and PEERRENT (competition) is significantly negative (positive) 
and, moreover, sufficiently large such that the net impact of competition is 
significantly positive for quoted firms
23. These findings are consistent with our 
analysis in Section 1. They indicate that, similar to the earlier mentioned proposition 
of Povel and Raith (2004), in an environment where capital constraints are important, 
competition may amplify these constraints and limit the reaction capacity of 
companies to competitive threats. The fact that for listed firms, the impact of 
competition is not just non-negative but strictly positive, indicates that either listed 
firms work under less constraints and are capable of making use of the information on 
innovation opportunities offered by competition and/or that also in a stock market 
where firms typically are controlled by large shareholders there is a problem of 
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Table 4 also shows that, similarly to competition, the impact of leverage differs 
depending upon whether the company is quoted or not. The coefficient LEV is 
statistically negative, implying that financial pressure hurts non-quoted companies. 
The coefficient of the interaction term with the QUOTED dummy is significantly 
positive but insufficient to create overall a significant positive effect for quoted firms. 
However after correction for endogeneity, the net effect of financial pressure becomes 
significantly positive for quoted companies. Again these findings are consistent with 
our hypotheses and indicate that, in our sample, the financial pressure and capital 
constraints that non-quoted firms face, are an unfavorable mix. By contrast, listed 
firms even benefit from financial pressure. This indicates that within our data set, debt 
is effective in reducing conflicts of interest created by the presence of shareholders 
from the public at large. These results are similar to Ruland and Zhou (2005). They 
find a negative impact of leverage on the value of low agency cost companies; by 
                                                 
23 The net effect of PEERRENT, LEV and FAMIL on productivity of quoted companies is tested by re-
estimating the models of Table 3A for a quoted subsample. F-statistics for the effect of the respective 
performance drivers for quoted companies are given in the bottom rows of Table 4. 
24 Models using firm specific rents instead of peer group rents yield comparable results.   21
contrast, for high agency cost firms, this effect is reversed, leading to a positive 
relationship between leverage and value in these latter companies. 
The last determinant of performance is family control. Also here the results follow 
a similar pattern to those of the preceding two drivers. Family control has a negative 
influence on the performance of non-quoted firms. For quoted ones, the net effect is 
positive, and significant when endogeneity of stock listing is corrected for through 
instrumental variables. This does not only indicate that quoted family firms perform 
better than non-quoted family firms but also that, all else being equal, quoted family 
firms perform better than other quoted companies. Taken together with our analysis of 
Section 1, these findings suggest that the increased transparency of public markets 
and/or opportunities to diversify the family fortune is an important force in improving 
performance of family firms.
25 Furthermore, as families are (potentially) better 
monitors, possible threats of a stock listing like free cash flow problems or agency 
conflicts are kept in check, which results in a better performance relative to other 
quoted companies. In fact, in line with our findings, Anderson and Reeb (2003) report 
for the US that quoted family firms in the S&P 500 outperform the non-family firms. 
Apparently also for Belgian companies the advantages of having a controlling family 
outweigh the potential costs, at least for public firms. 
Finally it is interesting to observe that in the models of Table 4, the significance of 
the QUOTED dummy is reduced and evaporates altogether once the endogeneity of 
listing is corrected for. This indicates that, at least in the present sample, the 
difference in the relationship between productivity and the performance drivers in a 
quoted environment as compared to private companies, explains the higher 
performance of public firms. Another interesting result from Table 4 is that overall, 
effects are more pronounced when endogeneity problems are solved. This indicates 
that ignoring possible endogeneity biases may lead to underestimation of the impact 
of stock listing on the relationship between performance and its determinants. 
 
                                                 
25 Our dataset shows that in Belgian quoted family firms, managers are often external members not 
related to the family. The family is however heavily represented in the board of directors. This way, 
family directors can strongly monitor management. In non-quoted family firms there is less separation 
between management and family control.   22
3.3. Some robustness checks  
 
In the present subsection we report two robustness checks. First, we investigate 
whether the difference in obligation to consolidate between quoted and non-quoted 
firms and voluntary consolidation affects our findings. Second, we evaluate the 
possible impact of size differences between the set of public and private firms.
  
To exclude possible biases either from the obligation to consolidate (for listed 
firms) or from possible a-selection due to voluntary consolidation, we exclude all 
firms that can not be considered as stand alone from the sample. We define a firm as a 
group member firm or a subsidiary when more than 50% of equity is directly 
controlled by another industrial company or group.
26 In view of the size of the 
remaining listed firms, none would escape the obligation to consolidate. Hence, we 
obtain a subsample of firms that are obliged to publish consolidated accounts, 
independent of their public or private status. Simultaneously we correct for possible 
biases due to the fact that group member firms may have less decision power as 
compared to firms that do not belong to a group.
27 It is also interesting to note that this 
subsample has the property that median rents do not significantly differ between 
quoted and unquoted companies. Preceding pruning excludes 18 quoted firms 
corresponding to 105 firm-year observations and 49 private companies with 173 firm-
years. The left hand side of Table 5 reports the findings. These prove to be very 
comparable to those of Table 4. The coefficients of all performance drivers keep the 
same sign and remain significant. However, due to the pruning of the public group 
companies, the net effect of leverage on quoted firms looses impact. This is consistent 
with the earlier mentioned results in Ruland and Zhou (2005) who report that leverage 
functions best in environments with high agency costs. For as the firms that likely are 
most subject to conflicts of interest, and hence high agency costs, have been 
discarded, it is not surprising that the net effect of leverage is reduced. Likely for the 
same reason, as compared to the other quoted firms in this subsample, family control 
in public companies only keeps a marginal net positive impact. Finally, consistent 
with a tendency observable (but not significant) in the univariate statistics, within this 
                                                 
26 We used direct ownership instead of ultimate ownership because data on the latter often is not 
always available for unquoted firms. 
27 This does not exclude the presence of large owners that control the firm. It only excludes the cases 
with one industrial company as a majority shareholder.   23
subset, relative to their private counterparts, quoted firms are relatively more efficient 
in their use of labor but less in their use of capital. 
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Next to pointing out global differences in the functioning of performance drivers 
between quoted and unquoted firms, the discussion in Section 1 indicated that within 
subgroups of firms, differences may also be present. In particular, due to possible 
extra exacerbation of capital constraints for the smallest non-quoted firms, the impact 
of competition and financial pressure could be worse than for the other companies. 
Also, the limited transparency and lesser organizational complexity of smaller firms 
exercise less pressure to professionalize family management. On the other hand the 
deeper pockets of larger quoted firms and their easy access to extra financing may 
influence the scope of performance drivers to mitigate free cash flow problems and/or 
conflicts of interest between large and small owners. Especially as the median size of 
the quoted and unquoted firms is different, the question arises to what extend findings 
may be influenced by these differences in size, even after the correction implied in the 
asset and employment variables. Therefore we report in the right hand side panel of 
Table 5 results for the case where the 20% smallest private and 20% largest public 
companies have been excluded. This subsample has the property that the non-quoted 
and quoted companies no longer differ in median size
28. Also firms that have 
consolidated voluntarily prove to have been discarded by this pruning criterion. 
Overall it has cut 82 non-quoted firms with 238 firm-years and 30 quoted companies 
with 176 firm-years from the sample. Results are again very similar to those of Table 
4 and those of the left hand side of Table 5. Just as in the latter case, the data show a 
decrease in significance of the net effect of leverage. Presently also the net effect of 
competition becomes insignificant. All this suggests that the largest firms benefit most 
from financial as well as competitive pressure. Finally, similar to the findings in the 
left hand side of Table 5, also within this subsample, relative to their private 
                                                 
28 Median total assets of quoted (about 115 million euros) and non-quoted companies (about 95 million 
euros) is no longer significantly different (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Z statistic = -1.046 with a p-value 
of 0.296).   24
counterparts, quoted firms prove to be more efficient in their use of labor but less in 





In this paper we study the impact of product market competition, financial 
pressure and ownership on a sample of quoted and non-quoted Belgian firms. We find 
that, even in Continental Europe, with its concentrated ownership and less transparent 
capital markets, the stock market environment is beneficial to firm performance. 
In particular, commensurate with earlier findings, public firms perform better than 
private ones. Also in line with earlier findings, competition, financial pressure and 
ownership type (family/non-family) prove to have a positive impact on total factor 
productivity. However, when these drivers are placed outside the public stock market, 
their effect reverses and becomes significantly negative. Within our sample, this 
difference in functioning explains why quoted firms perform better than unquoted 
ones. 
Our results also show that (empirical) findings for public companies need not hold 
for private ones. For one thing, while for public firms optimizing debt structure may 
involve an increase in leverage, ceteris paribus, such optimization may involve a 
decrease in debt for unquoted firms. It also shows that quoted firms may be better able 
to withstand competition, and that it may be optimal for companies to seek a 
quotation, not only when they have growth opportunities but also to increase their 
ability to react upon competitive threats. Furthermore a public status supports 
improvements in management for family firms, leading to superior performance. 
Finally, our results are in line with those of the IPO literature on the motives of 
going public. The product market motive, i.e. gaining strategic advantages relative to 
                                                 
29 We also performed several additional robustness checks. One focuses on the impact of a change in 
public status on our results. As discussed in Section 2, 46 companies change their status from quoted to 
non-quoted or vice versa, while we only have consolidated statements before and after the change for 
13 of them. In the years surrounding a change in public status, behavior may be a-typical. Although we 
have taken into account the endogeneity of the public/non public status, as a further check we have re-
estimated the models of Table 4 on a subsample in which status changing firms were excluded for 2 
years before and after the event. Results are similar to those reported. As a second additional check we 
estimated a cross sectional model with the variables of Table 4, whereby instead of yearly data, the 
average of each variable over the sample period is taken. Thereby the 13 companies with both quoted 
and unquoted observations were labeled as quoted. As a final additional check we discarded the 10% 
most highly levered unquoted firms and the 10% least levered public firms. Then leverage is no longer 
significantly different between quoted and unquoted companies. All estimations yield similar results to 
those reported.   25
(non quoted) rivals in the same market segment (Stoughton et al., 2001; Pagano et al., 
2002; among others), is considered to be especially relevant for companies in 
industries where competitive dynamics are an important consideration for long-term 
success. This is consistent with our finding that a stock listing creates an environment 
where product market competition more easily enhances productivity and 
performance. The possibility to rebalance the financial structure and improve a 
company’s position relative to its debt holders is found to be another important 
benefit of going public (Rajan, 1992; Pagano et al., 1998; among others). Again this 
motive is in line with our finding that for quoted companies, possibly after such a 
rebalancing, financial pressure has no longer a negative influence upon performance. 
Another well studied IPO-motive concerns ownership and control. Ehrhardt and 
Nowak (2003) and Pagano et al. (1998) point out that firms tend to opt for a stock 
listing when existing ownership and control structures no longer fit the company. In 
line with Anderson and Reeb (2003), our results provide empirical evidence 
supporting the validity of this perspective by indicating that family control becomes 
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Table 1 

































Companies that went public during the sample period and for which we have both quoted and unquoted 




Panel B: period 1996-2003 
Industry  Number of 
firms  Non-Quoted Quoted 
































Panel C: period 1992-2003 
Industry  Number of 
firms  Non-Quoted Quoted 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for quoted and non-quoted subsamples over the period  
1992-2003 
Panel A 
   Full 
Sample 
Non- 
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The F-test statistic for the means test and the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Z-statistic for the median test 
are given in the respective rows together with the corresponding P-value. The difference in proportion 
of family firms was tested using Pearsons Chi Square on firms as well as on firm-years. 
Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 
§ Calculated over the 1996-2003 period. 
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Table 3 
Benchmark models estimated over the period 1996-2003 
Panel A: Determinants of firm performance 



























































































Panel B: Determinants of firm performance; impact of stock listing 




































































































The dependent variable in all models is the natural logarithm of value added (LNVA). Explanatory 
variables are as defined in subsection 2.2. In Columns 1 and 2 (lagged variable) a one year lagged 
value of LEV is used. Columns 3 and 4 use a predicted value of LEV and QUOTED based on 
instrumental variables as explained in Section 3.1. All models use random firm effects. Industry and 
year dummies are included in all models. Columns labeled “Industry specific elasticities” use industry 
specific factor elasticities. T-statistics in parentheses. 
Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   32
Table 4 
Determinants of firm performance estimated over the period 1996-2003 















































































































































































The dependent variable in all models is the natural logarithm of value added (LNVA). Explanatory 
variables are as defined in subsection 2.2. Q*(variable) indicates interaction term with the dummy 
QUOTED. In Columns 1 and 2 (lagged variable) a one year lagged value of LEV is used. Columns 3 
and 4 (instrumental variables) use a predicted value of LEV and QUOTED based on instrumental 
variables as explained in Section 3.1. All models use random firm effects. Industry and year dummies 
are included in all models. Columns labeled “Industry specific elasticities” use industry specific factor 
elasticities. T-statistics in parentheses. Total impact of PEERRENT; LEV and FAMIL on productivity 
of quoted companies is tested by re-estimating the models of table 3A for a quoted subsample, F-
statistics for the effect of the respective performance drivers for quoted companies are given in the 
bottom rows of the Table. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.   33
Table 5 
Robustness checks estimated over the period 1996-2003 
 Subsidiaries  excluded  20% smallest non-quoted and 
20% largest quoted excluded 















































































































































































The left hand side represents the results for the subsample where subsidiaries are excluded; the right 
hand side shows the results for the subsample where 20% smallest non-quoted and 20% largest quoted 
are excluded. The dependent variable in all models is the natural logarithm of value added (LNVA). 
Explanatory variables are as defined in subsection 2.2. Q*(variable) indicates interaction term with the 
dummy QUOTED. All models are estimated with a predicted value of LEV and QUOTED based on 
instrumental variables as explained in Section 3.1. All models use random firm effects. Industry and 
year dummies are included in all models. Columns labeled “Industry specific elasticities” use industry 
specific factor elasticities. T-statistics in parentheses. Total impact of PEERRENT; LEV and FAMIL 
on productivity of quoted companies is tested by re-estimating the models of table 3A for a quoted 
subsample, F-statistics for the effect of the respective performance drivers for quoted companies are 
given in the bottom rows of the Table. Level of significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%. 